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Abstract
The essay addresses the manifold relationships between art and research under the perspective 
of the arts’ own way of thinking, separating artistic knowledge-production from science. While in 
science ‘research’ means a goal-guided action that has the purpose of developing truth, in the 
arts research is related to an open ‘search’ without being bound to gaining results. Obviously, 
art works neither with concepts nor with propositions, nor does it need any theory or general 
model or ways of verifying theses and making them valid. There is also no method to follow, 
nor does art depend on public justifications through critique. Rather, art is based in practices 
that let something appear and make it perceivable, and by doing so producing new insights. 
Hence, artistic cognition and recognition it not based in logic, but in certain non-discursive 
media-‘languages’ which allow for non-propositional reflections on their own structure and 
limitations, using actions, performances, images, material objects, compositions and montage 
or multimedia installations that go against the grain in order to push perceptibility to its limits 
where contradictions become apparent.
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Resumen
El ensayo aborda las relaciones múltiples entre el arte y la investigación bajo la perspectiva de 
la propia manera de pensar de las artes, que separa la producción de conocimiento artístico 
de la ciencia. Mientras que en ciencia «investigación» significa acción guiada por un objetivo 
que tiene la finalidad de desarrollar la verdad, en las artes, la investigación se relaciona con 
una «búsqueda» abierta sin estar obligada a obtener resultados. Obviamente, el arte no trabaja 
ni con conceptos ni con proposiciones, ni tampoco necesita ninguna teoría o modelo general 
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o maneras de verificar tesis y hacerlas válidos. Tampoco hay ningún método a seguir ni el 
arte tampoco depende de justificaciones públicas por medio de las críticas. Más bien el arte 
está basado en prácticas que dejan aparecer algo, lo hacen perceptible y de esta manera 
se producen nuevas ideas. Por lo tanto, la cognición y reconocimiento artísticos no están 
basados en la lógica, sino en ciertos «lenguajes» mediáticos no discursivos que permiten 
reflexiones no proposicionales en su propia estructura y limitaciones, mediante el uso de 
acciones, performances, imágenes, objetos materiales, composiciones, collages o instalaciones 
multimedia que van a contracorriente para provocar la perceptibilidad a sus márgenes, cuando 
las contradicciones se hacen aparentes.
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investigación, búsqueda, producción de conocimiento, juicio, percepción, auto-reflexión zetética
1.
Art research and artistic research – a difference of five letters has been 
the occasion for considerable debate for over more than a decade. 
Art research – mainly used to signify research about art – brings 
together two concepts that in themselves seem to have nothing in 
common, kept apart by a space or combined with a hyphen or a slash. 
Using a hyphen or a slash produces multiple meanings because it 
confronts us with different relations or conjunctions, which, as the 
‘con’ signifies, at once bring together and separate. Art-research or 
art/research then puts the practice of research face to face with art, 
so that we are not only dealing with research about art, but also with 
research through art, which reveals the use of art as a medium for 
research. The different prepositions that come into play here mark 
the different relational modalities between the concepts. The fact 
that each contains distinct possibilities shows us that the notion of 
‘art research’ can mean a number of things. In contrast, if we look 
at the concept of artistic research, art or artistry only figures as an 
adjective, a feature of research. Nevertheless, the combination raises 
the question of the genitive, because every adjective form can be 
transformed into a noun with the double genitivus subjectivus and 
objectivus, which is to say: research of art (as a medium), and the 
art of research in terms of research as artistry. On the one hand, 
this makes research itself into an art, altering our understanding 
of research, while on the other, art becomes in itself research, thus 
opening the doors to a new approach to art in the postmodern era. 
The terms thus open up a labyrinth of possible relations between 
research and art. When talking about ‘research in the arts’, we 
have to clarify what we mean by ‘research’. Research is usually 
understood as a tool or practice – again two different modalities 
– of knowledge production. It is worth noting that the latter notion 
implies that knowledge is not given, but made or constructed – a 
thesis pioneered by Science and Technology Studies with its ideas 
about epistemic things, their networks of agencies and the genuine 
creativity of empirical research. Over the past ten years, these ideas 
have come to be projected onto the arts, though seemingly without 
any justification. One side effect has been that scientific work and 
its erratic search for truth have taken on the nobility of a pseudo-
artistic effort. Again, it seems to be necessary here to clarify the inner 
relationship between art and knowledge, which produces meanings 
that are as diverse as the aforementioned relations between art and 
research. In other words, art research and artistic research as well as 
artistic knowledge or knowledge production through the arts cannot 
be taken for granted, not only because expecting to derive knowledge 
from art is a highly questionable endeavour, but also because the 
vocabulary itself is ambiguous. Thus, in order to make sense of ‘art 
research’ and ‘artistic research’, we have to carefully distinguish and 
define the various concepts involved. 
2.
Let us first elaborate on the notion of ‘research’. It is among the most 
ambiguous terms in the entire debate. Its haziness begins with its 
use in the sciences, especially if we distinguish the natural sciences 
from the humanities. This is not the fault of an imprecise scientific 
discussion, but is simply a consequence of the fact that the term 
cannot really be defined. Obviously, from an etymological point of view, 
research is related to search, and both questioning and searching 
belong to the most basic of human practices. However, we should 
consider what the prefix ‘re-’ in ‘re-search’ means. ‘Re’ hints at the 
action of looking back, the act of reconsideration, taking a second 
view or reflecting; indeed, in trying to describe ‘re’, we use it again in 
the words ‘re-consideration’ and ‘re-flection’. Hence, we can explain 
the ‘re’ only in reference to the ‘re’, which is an act of ‘repetition’, 
a fundamental semiotic activity. We have to repeat or reiterate the 
search in order to become aware of it, in order to use it properly, 
and in order to become aware of its foundations or conditions, its 
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medium, or at least about the way we are conducting the search. 
The ‘way’ – in Ancient Greek hodos – makes itself apparent here: 
we are trying to understand how we are following the traces of the 
concept of ‘re-search’; we are trying to learn about its function, its 
trajectories, its results and so on. Our ‘method’ is meta hodos. Thus, 
the ‘re’ in ‘research’ hints at its methodological approach. However, 
this methodological attitude is not necessarily connected with peculiar 
rules or distinct orders, but with the ability to follow the path again and 
again. Repetition and reconsideration turn the search into significance, 
a precise procedure. As Sigmund Freud taught us, repetition is one 
of the most pestering desires in human life. According to Jacques 
Derrida, repetition is necessary to transform a thing or an event 
into a signature or scripture that makes it readable. Thus, the ‘re’ in 
research makes the search into a systematic practice that produces 
a distinct conclusion or outcome that can be judged or discussed 
and re-discussed. This makes clear that the ‘re’ in research is indeed 
essential. It is not only crucial for the methodological process, but also 
fundamental for that which we call ‘cognition’ or ‘knowledge’, be it 
given or produced. Thus, to turn art into research necessitates a kind 
of reflexivity that affects the research results themselves. Indeed, the 
concept of ‘re’-sults brings us back to the mysterious ‘re’: every ‘re’-
sult is a reconsidered problem-solution that we might also conceive 
of as a form ‘re-cognition’, which we usually call ‘knowledge’.
3.
But is knowledge in itself the result of a process of production? If we 
view knowledge as the product of ‘production’, then we’re talking 
about poiein, the creation and practices of revelation, its procedures 
or operations and their impact on knowledge – in other words, 
we’re talking about processes of construction. Historically, however, 
research has not always been seen as a form of production. This brings 
our attention to the fact that all the terms we are using here have 
undergone considerable changes throughout history, which makes it 
difficult to compare our understanding and use of the terms ‘research’ 
(a term nearly unknown in Antiquity), episteme and knowledge with 
their usage in earlier eras. They are incommensurable, and it is 
only from early modernity on that knowledge has been associated 
with things like objectivity in the sense of proven knowledge. In the 
seventeenth century at the latest, ‘research’ came to be seen as a 
goal-guided action that had the purpose of developing truth, even if 
we don’t know what ‘truth’ means, are skeptical about it as a concept 
in general, or reject its significance in the human realm because we 
view it as a mere construct. As both a methodological and a goal-
guided practice, knowledge and research were considered to be 
exoteric practices that were open to the public, in contrast to esoteric 
practices, which were meaningful only for the illuminated few. This 
means that knowledge as a normative principle was considered to 
be open to public reasoning, while art was often accused of being 
the opposite, an esoteric, and thus largely arbitrary and irrational 
practice. Esoteric and exoteric deal with oppositions: exodos means 
‘exit’, eisodos ‘entrance’, reserved for those people who were insiders 
or close members of the circle or community of truth-seekers or 
artists, while exoterism was open to the public by nature of the fact 
that it was based on things both plausible and comprehensible, which 
guarantee its ‘publicity’ (in its literal sense).
Thus, knowledge is first and foremost an act of communication 
and is therefore based in language as its ruling regime. Knowledge 
and research in traditional fields like science, mathematics, the 
humanities and even philosophy are based in discourse. Even if 
scientists use images, diagrams, material models or samples as 
proof, their doing so is always already embedded in discourse and 
its textuality, because every sample or epistemic thing serves as a 
sign. Thus, ‘knowledge’ and ‘research’ are articulated in propositions, 
which means that both are based in reasoning and publicity. This 
makes results debatable, because everyone who has the faculty of 
reason should be able to make a judgement about them. Only that 
which can be expressed in the form of propositions can be recognized 
and categorized as discursively meaningful and therefore worthy of 
being called ‘knowledge’. Thus, when using terms like ‘knowledge’ 
or ‘research’ in relation to art, we often tend to rely on traditional 
meanings, which is to say scientific understandings. However, I would 
like to propose that we shift the discourse and define these terms 
anew when using them to describe artistic practices – otherwise, 
we run the danger of getting lost in contradictions, making the whole 
attempt to discuss art within the rubric of cognition and research 
pretty unproductive.
4.
The main question then is: how is it possible to apply these 
interpretations of ‘knowledge’ and ‘research’ to art? Can art be 
conceived of as an alternative way of producing significance? Or 
of gaining insights? Or even a kind of wisdom that differs from 
knowledge? Art research and artistic research are modes of 
reconsidering or reflecting on a search that reflects or reconsiders 
itself in terms of ‘re-search’ as search. My suggestion here is that 
the arts bring research back to its roots, which is to say: searching. In 
other words, the question of research in the arts is about searching, 
thus leaving out the ‘re’. There are two reasons for this: first, art 
does not achieve clear ’re-sults’ in terms of reconsidered outcomes 
or solutions, but rather produces singular paradigms or models of 
comprehension that exist only once. Second, art does not speak in 
the medium of claims or propositions, but uses different media such 
as actions, performances, images, material objects, compositions, 
montage and multimedia installations with their own structures or 
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dispositifs. Art expresses itself in ‘aisthetic’ forms, and the crucial 
question is if and how it is possible to gain ‘knowledge’ through 
these aisthetic or non-propositional modes of mediation. In other 
words, if we claim that art is a mode of knowledge production, what 
kind of ‘knowledge’ is gained through these media, that is, through 
non-discursive practices?
It is important to consider that artistic labour is of a completely 
different nature than scientific labour. It is obvious that art neither 
works with concepts nor with propositions, nor does it need any 
theory or general model or ways of verifying theses and making 
them valid. There is also no method to follow. Nor does art depend 
on public justifications through critique. However, that does not mean 
that artists are totally autonomous or free to do anything they please. 
Rather, art is based on practices that bring something to the fore, let it 
appear and make it perceivable. At the same time, it reflects on these 
things, looks at them on their own terms, at their way of doing, their 
media or, as it were, their ‘language’. Art thus makes the imperceptible 
visible or audible through perception in order to push visibility or 
audibility to their margins where contradictions become apparent. 
And contradictions, paradoxes and vexations are the preferred 
media of cognition in art. Thus, practices of art are different from 
practices of science and even from practices of philosophy and the 
humanities. They differ in their perspective, their treatment of objects, 
in their processes, in how they deal with material and examples, 
and so on. Nothing is comparable, and if art is a mode of searching 
and of taking its own, unique path to knowledge, then we have to 
change our vocabulary or use the term ‘knowledge’ in a completely 
different way, either as a metaphor or in quotation marks, because 
artistic argumentation, as it were, articulates itself through contrasts, 
through conflicts or contradictions and not through statements, clear-
cut concepts and explicit propositions that can be discussed and 
debated. The figures in rhetoric that have the most affinity with art are 
parallaxes, chiasms and catachresis, not description or explanation. 
Indeed, art manifests itself and its knowledge in these figures. 
5.
Thus, the normal scientific ordering of arguments or justifications in 
discourse and their use of distinctions and determinations cannot 
serve as a guideline for aesthetic research. Rather, they are ruptured 
by art or inverted and converted into something that resists logical 
form and linear expression. Art elides propositional logic and the 
order of language and withdraws from unambiguous determination. 
This also holds true for the relationship between knowledge and 
truth, because no art can be pressed into the straitjacket of the 
‘true/false’ binary, just as little as art can be rejected for being 
‘false’. Instead, artistic events show, or more properly: they articulate 
themselves through the conflicting and unstable double-sidedness 
of showing an object and self-showing. Every act of showing is 
affirmative. Thus, showing allows no true/false distinction and hence 
no discrimination or differentiation; rather, it works in the space 
of revelation and deception. With respect to knowledge, the main 
difference between science and art is that the latter is related to 
concealment and un-concealment, while only the former deals with 
truth and falsehood.
However, if this is the case, then one might ask whether it 
makes sense to speak about ‘knowledge’ at all when discussing 
aesthetic practices of searching as practices of showing, presenting, 
manifesting, exposing and exhibiting. In other words, is there a non-
propositional episteme, a knowledge-practice beyond propositional 
determination or judgement? Let us answer these questions very 
briefly with three ideas. 
Firstly, we analyzed the ‘re’ in research as denoting the act of 
repetition, and instead of applying this to art, we underscored the fact 
that artistic knowledge production has to be seen as a practice of 
searching without ‘re’, which means as a practice without repetition 
or method. In contrast to science, the ‘re’ in artistic ‘re-search’ can 
be related to certain modes of reflexivity in searching; in other words, 
it entails a certain critical attitude that doubts itself to the point of 
obsession, poring over every single detail. What does this mean? The 
style of searching in art – and this the thesis here – is a singular 
process of questioning, which at the same time questions its own 
quest, its conditions, the artist’s own mode of desire or his or her 
hidden agenda, the possible violation of the sanctity of hidden things 
involved in the search, its medial constellation, context, framework 
and so on, sometimes even in an ironic manner. In short, rather than 
talking about research, we should look at the peculiar form of thinking 
articulated in art, the way in which art, as a medium and practice, 
produces insights. Thus, the first point I would like to make about 
the debate on art research and artistic research is that we need to 
shift our perspective from the goal-driven research practice we find 
in the sciences to the peculiarity of artistic thinking, a way of thinking 
that is different from scientific and even philosophical thinking, that 
is otherwise than thought or beyond thinking, to rephrase Emmanuel 
Lévinas’ famous book title Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence.
Second, we also have to take a different approach to knowledge, 
because its traditional use is too narrow to adequately characterize 
the process of art’s ‘otherwise than thought’. As discussed above, 
the true/false distinction does not apply to art because art reveals. 
Revealing is not a form of knowledge production that constructs 
knowledge, but is instead an opening. Strictly speaking, an opening 
cannot be produced. Openness reveals itself. Therefore, instead of 
speaking about production or staging or construction, we should look 
at the ways in which art reveals or discloses phenomena that were 
beforehand unknown, overlooked, concealed, or excluded. In other 
words, art’s reflexivity is able to open up new perspectives, uncover 
hidden phenomena, and disclose latent, displaced or suppressed parts 
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of the real. Thus, rather than producing knowledge in its common 
meaning, art produces awareness. This is why it is better to talk about 
art’s wisdom, which is, quite similar to philosophy, prior to science 
and older than it. 
Third, art’s knowledge serves, as it were, as a window into the 
unknown, but it does not necessarily aim at progress, neither in 
the sense of doing ‘better’ art nor in the sense of prodding on art’s 
development, because there is no evolution in the arts, only alteration. 
Hence, there is no end and no outcome. The only process of knowledge 
art is involved with is a form of knowledge-as-opening, disclosing, or 
unveiling that which is concealed; art is a witty way of introducing 
us to new ways of thinking and acting in the world. Analogous to 
skeptical philosophy, we might call this a ‘zetetical’ process: It is not 
an ‘inquiry’ or ‘investigation’ in terms of proceedings, but a search 
that also researches itself, its medium or ‘language’ as well as the 
researcher itself. And while doing so, it constantly exceeds borders 
and finds new divisions and partitions. Zetetic searching is endless. In 
contrast to scientific ‘heuristics’, it is based on fundamental openings, 
which includes openness to the unknown or unexpected, into which 
it is drawn and in which it allows the searcher herself to become 
entangled. Thus, artistic research is always ‘in becoming’, a bold 
adventure – it addresses the artist’s life, his or her imagination, and 
seeks to transform his or her being-in-the-world, his or her entire 
mode of understanding, thinking and acting. 
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